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ABSTRACT
The South African apartheid system formally ended with the election of the African National
Congress at the first all-race elections held in 1994.  As a result, racist policies such as color
barring, that particularly hindered the advancement of black workers throughout the apartheid
period are no longer legal.  Yet the legacy of apartheid may endure as a result of both the
persistence of racial differences in human capital attributes and the possible continuation of
discriminatory practices within employment.  In this paper we examine the evolution of the
racial wage hierarchy in the early post-apartheid era against the background of the long-term
decline in racial wage disparities observed over the latter years of the apartheid regime.  We find
evidence that the position of black workers between 1995 and 1997 actually deteriorated relative
to the overall geometric mean wage, while that of colored, asian and white workers improved.
JEL Codes:  J71, J31
11.  Introduction
The South African apartheid system formally ended with the election of the African National
Congress at the first all-race elections held in 1994.  These elections concluded 46 years of
official racial discrimination and inequality that had its roots in social structures, practices and
attitudes dating back to the early nineteenth century.  Despite the political transformation that has
occurred and the elimination of overtly discriminatory laws and regulations, ‘the overall
consequences of the legacy of apartheid are deeply embedded in the polity, society and economy
of the country’ (Presidential Commission, 1996) potentially undermining the aspirations of the
new South African democracy, at least within a reasonable time-frame.
Discrimination in the labor market was at the heart of the apartheid system, resulting in
the use of non-productivity-related criteria in decisions concerning the allocation and utilization
of labor such as in recruitment, remuneration, firing and retrenchment (Presidential Commission,
1996).  Apartheid policies adopted by the white-dominated National Party government such as
color barring and job reservation, for example through the Industrial Conciliation Act 1956,
constituted statutory forms of racial discrimination and have now been repealed.  Labor market
outcomes were also conditioned by various institutional barriers to labor mobility and through
the differential provision of and access to education, training and social welfare.  These forms of
pre-labor market discrimination have also been subject to fundamental reform with, for example,
the repeal of the Bantu Urban Areas Act 1945 and the Bantu Education Act 1955.
However the repeal of apartheid legislation is unlikely to be sufficient to eradicate the
established racial wage hierarchy.  On this issue, USA and other international experience offers
some relevant insights even though it tends to concern discrimination against a minority, rather
than the majority as is the case in South Africa.  In particular, Darity and Mason (1998) and
Altonji and Blank (1999) review a large literature on the USA labor market which provides
evidence that the signal Civil Rights Act of 1964 led to a sustained and significant decline in
2black/white earnings differentials over the following decade (Donahue and Heckman, 1991), but
that substantial racial disparities remained which have proved remarkably persistent over time.
Arrow (1998) stresses the potential importance of non-taste-based ‘statistical discrimination’ and
of social interactions and networks in influencing behavior and perpetuating differential
treatment in the USA.  Moreover, it is clear that past pre-labor market discrimination,
particularly in the provision of education, can contribute markedly to continuing inequalities in
the labor market since disadvantage tends to be self-reproducing and reinforcing.  Case and
Deaton (1998) have found that in South Africa those with poor education are often unable to
secure sufficient income to provide for the education of their children.
It is in this context that this paper investigates racial wage differentials, discrimination
and disadvantage in the South African labor market.  The objective of the paper is to employ a
robust multilateral decomposition procedure to examine differences in racial wage differentials
between 1995 and 1997, and to view such differences from a longer, historical perspective by
drawing a comparison with the level of racial disadvantage and discrimination observed in 1980.
Knight and McGrath (1987), Moll (1995) and Treiman et al. (1996) have all investigated
changing levels of wage discrimination in South Africa but these studies have been based on
methodologies producing only binary comparisons of the wage position of whites with that of
one or more of the non-white groups.  Our analysis includes more recent evidence and the
adoption of a multilateral decomposition procedure permits the joint decomposition of the wage
differentials of two or more groups into productivity and discrimination components.  Thus, the
approach more readily allows an investigation of the changing basis of the racial wage hierarchy
within South Africa and of the relative positions of blacks, coloreds, asians and whites in the
post-apartheid era.
The structure of the working paper is as follows.  Section 2 outlines the methodology
which is used to estimate wage discrimination.  Sections 3 and 4 respectively gives details of the
3main wage function and decomposition analyses based on hourly wage rate data for 1995 and
1997.  Section 5 gives details of the supplementary analysis based on monthly earnings data for
1980, 1995 and 1997.  Conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
2.  Methodological Framework
This section presents a multilateral procedure that facilitates investigation of the changing basis
of the racial wage hierarchy within South Africa by providing a joint decomposition of the
logarithmic wage differentials between black, colored, asian and white groups.  Like other
decomposition techniques our methodology measures discrimination indirectly as the residual
component from an estimated wage function.  Inevitably, errors in the specification of the wage
determination model will lead to inaccurate estimates of discrimination.  In addition, the results
are sensitive to the specification and estimation of the non-discriminatory wage structure.
However, data problems preclude a more direct approach to the measurement of racial wage
discrimination in South Africa.
Following Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) the difference in the mean of the natural logarithm
of wages for groups j and k in period t can be decomposed into an explained component which
captures productivity differences between workers, and an unexplained component which
includes racial wage discrimination:
)1Dln()1Qln()1Gln( jktjktjkt +++=+ ;   j,k = black, colored, asian, white  (1)
where: Gjkt is the gross (unadjusted) wage differential defined as ((Wjt / Wkt) − 1) where Wjt is the
geometric mean wage of group j and Wkt is the corresponding wage of group k; Qjkt is the
productivity differential )1)W/W(( *kt
*
jt −  where *jtW  and 
*
ktW  denote the geometric mean wage
rates of each group in the absence of labor market discrimination; and Djkt is identified as the
4market discrimination coefficient )W/W/())W/W()W/W(( *kt
*
jt
*
kt
*
jtktjt − , that is the
proportionate difference between ( 1G jkt + ) and ( jktQ + 1).
Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) show that the discrimination term can be decomposed
in terms of the wage that each group receives relative to that which it would receive in the
absence of discrimination.  In Allanson et al. (2000), we further partition both the logarithmic
gross wage differential and the productivity component, to yield complementary measures of the
geometric mean wage that each racial group receives relative to that of the workforce as a whole
under both the (observed) discriminatory and (hypothetical) non-discriminatory wage structures.
Thus (1) can be expanded to:
{ } { } { })1ln()1ln()1ln()1ln()1ln()1ln( ktjtktjtktjt +−+++−+=+−+ δδθθγγ (2)
where γ
jt
 is the differential between the geometric mean wage of group j and that of the entire
workforce )1)W/W(( tjt − , where Wt is the overall geometric mean wage; θjt is the differential
between the geometric mean wage of group j and that of the entire workforce in the absence of
discrimination )1)W/W(( *t
*
jt − ; δjt is the differential between the geometric mean wage of
group j and the wage that workers of group j would receive in the absence of discrimination
)1)W/W(( *jtjt − ; and γkt, θkt and δkt are similarly defined for group k.  The main advantage of
(2) over the standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition equation is that each component of the
decomposition equation is expressed as the difference between two terms that are defined
independently of the particular binary comparison that is being made.  The complete set of γ, δ
and θ coefficients constitute a set of sufficient statistics for the multilateral analysis of the racial
wage hierarchy.
5If the data on wages consist solely of point observations, the decomposition equation (2)
may be operationalised by using ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate separate semi-
logarithmic wage functions:
gititgitgit uXWln +′= β ;     g=1,…nit ; (3)
for each racial group i (i= black, colored, asian, white) using cross-sectional data for period t,
where gitWln  is the logarithmic wage of worker g in group i, gitX  is a vector of worker
characteristics, itβ  is a vector of group-specific coefficients and nit is the sample size.  A similar
function for the workforce as a whole may be estimated using the pooled sample of size nt:
;uXWln htththt +′= β      h=1,… nt;      nt =Σ nit; (4)
where htWln  is the logarithmic wage of worker h, htX  is a vector of worker characteristics and
tβ  is a vector of coefficients.  Given some estimate of the non-discriminatory wage structure
∗
t
~β  in year t, estimates of the decomposition terms in equation (2) can then be derived as:
ttitittitit
~X~XWlnWln)1ln{
~~~ ββγ ′−′=−=+ ;   ∀i  (5)
*
ttit
*
t
*
itit
~)XX(WlnWln)1ln{
~~~ βθ ′−=−=+ ; ∀i  (6)
)~~(XWlnWln)1ln{ *titit
*
ititit
~~~ ββδ −′=−=+ ; ∀i  (7)
where itX  is the vector of mean values of the regressors for group i, tX  is the corresponding
mean vector for the whole workforce, and tildes denote estimates.  Hence, it
~θ  may be
6interpreted as the estimated wage differential between a typical worker in group i, with
characteristics itX , and a typical worker in the entire workforce, with characteristics tX , under
the hypothetical non-discriminatory wage structure in period t; and it
~δ  as the estimated wage
differential for a typical worker in group i between the discriminatory and non-discriminatory
wage structures.  Moreover, changes in the left hand side terms in (6) and (7) between any two
periods t=0 and t=1 may be decomposed in the standard way (Altonji and Blank, 1999) to give:
)~~()XX(~))XX()XX((}1ln{}1ln{ *0
*
111i
*
000i11i0i1i
~~ βββθθ −′−+′−−′−=+−+ ; ∀i  (8)
)~~)(XX())~~()~~((X}1ln{}1ln{ *11i0i1i
*
00i
*
11i0i0i1i
~~ ββββββδδ −′−′+−−−′=+−+ ;  ∀i  (9)
where the first term on the right hand side (RHS) of (8) is the net change in the productivity term
due to changes in worker characteristics given the non-discriminatory coefficient values in t=0
(i.e., the hypothetical returns to those characteristics in a non-discriminatory market in the base
year), with the residual due to changes in non-discriminatory coefficients given worker
characteristics in t=1; and the first term on the RHS of (9) is the net change in the discrimination
term due to changes in coefficient values given worker characteristics in t=0, with the residual
due to changes in worker characteristics given the coefficient values in t=1.
 All that is now required is to obtain some estimate of the non-discriminatory wage
structure *t
~β .  A convenient candidate is the pooled OLS estimator, which Neumark (1988)
shows can be derived from a model of employer discrimination in which the utility function of
the employer is homogeneous of degree zero within each category of labor, that is the employer
only cares about the proportion of each group employed in any particular labor category.  In the
7 multi-group case, application of this estimator yields:
t
*
t
~~ ββ = ; (10)
where t
~β  is the OLS estimator of βt derived using the pooled sample in (4).  Thus *t~β  will
depend on the characteristics of workers from all racial groups, though individual elements of
t
~β  need not be bracketed by the corresponding elements of it~β  from the separately estimated
racial wage structures (Oaxaca and Ransom, 1994).  Moreover, the overall geometric mean wage
will be the same under the discriminatory and non-discriminatory wage structures, that is
*
t
  
t WlnWln
~~
= , yielding an exact decomposition of the gross wage differential term given by
~~~
)1ln{)1ln{)1ln{ ititit +++=+ δθγ .  This makes the interpretation of the decomposition results
particularly simple.
In practice, OLS estimation of (3) and (4) will be infeasible if some or all of the
observations on wages take the form of interval data as will often be the case since surveys
typically request only the earnings category into which the respondent falls.  Estimation in these
circumstances may be accomplished by use of a generalized Tobit estimator (StataCorp, 1997,
Volume 1, p. 145) to deal with the censoring of the dependent variable.  Letting it
~β and t~β  in
(5)-(10) now denote the Tobit estimates of the wage function coefficients, such that
ititit
~XWln
~ β′=  and t't*tt ~XWlnWln
~~ β== , the decomposition analysis will go through as before.
In particular, the decomposition of the gross wage differential term
~~~
)1ln{)1ln{)1ln{ ititit +++=+ δθγ  will continue to hold exactly in the data.  The generalized
Tobit estimator yields identical results to the OLS estimator in the special case in which all
observations on the dependent variable are point data.
83.  Wage function analysis
The data for the main analysis are derived from the 1995 and 1997 October Household Surveys
(OHSs).  These surveys have been conducted annually by Statistics South Africa (formerly the
Central Statistical Service) since 1993, though the 1993 survey is not comparable with the
subsequent surveys since it excluded the former bantustan states of Transkei, Bophuthatswana,
Venda and Ciskei (TBVC states).  The 1994 OHS was the first household survey to cover the
entire country with 30000 households surveyed in 1000 sampled Enumeration Areas (EAs) with
30 households sampled in each EA.  We have previously used the data from this survey to
analyze racial wage discrimination at the outset of the post-apartheid regime (Allanson et al.,
2000).  The 1995 and 1997 surveys have been the other two OHSs to be conducted with a sample
size of 30,000 households, but in both cases these were selected from 3000 sampled EAs with
ten households interviewed in each EA.  The results based on these two surveys that we report in
this paper are not consistent with our earlier work based on the 1994 OHS.  We believe that the
reason for this discrepancy may be that the sample for the 1994 OHS was less widely dispersed
throughout the country and that the results based on the later surveys are therefore likely to be
more reliable.
One of the main purposes of the OHS is to obtain indicators of the size of the
economically active population in South Africa with special reference to the number of
unemployed persons. Employees in all formal as well as informal business sectors are covered
by the OHS since the survey is based on households, not businesses.  Each annual OHS was
conducted as an independent survey based on a different sample design: the sampling procedure
involved stratification by province and by EA type in 1995 and by province and by transitional
metropolitan and district councils in 1997.  In both cases, independent samples of EAs were
drawn for each stratum within each province, with the smaller provinces given a
disproportionately larger number of EAs than the bigger provinces.  In each year, 3000 EAs were
9drawn as primary sampling units (PSUs) with the probability of an individual EA within a
stratum being chosen being proportional to the number of households in the EA.  Finally, ten
households were selected in each EA by means of systematic sampling to give the 30000
households visited as ultimate sampling units in the surveys.
Prior to the introduction of the Labor Force Survey in January 2000, the OHS was the
only source of official data on the hours and earnings of individual workers in post-apartheid
South Africa.  For our analysis of racial wage rate differentials we initially restricted the sample
from the OHS to male employees, aged between 15 and 64 and working full-time as non-migrant
workers in all sectors other than agriculture forestry and fishing, mining and quarrying, and the
armed services.  We excluded female and part-time workers on the grounds that these categories
of workers might face discrimination on the basis of gender and employment status, which could
bias our estimates of the extent of racial wage discrimination.  The age restrictions limit the
sample to adults not engaged in retirement occupations. Migrant workers are excluded as the
OHS only collects full information in respect of persons who normally reside at least four nights
a week in sampled households. Workers in the agricultural sector are excluded due to
inconsistencies in the enumeration of agricultural workers caused by changes to the identification
procedure for non-urban areas between 1995 and 1997. Workers in the mining industry are
excluded due to uncertainty as to the coverage of people living in hostels in the 1997 OHS.
Finally, South African Defense force members are excluded, as the 1995 OHS does not contain a
detailed breakdown of military occupations.
We further restricted the sample to those workers for which we could calculate reliable
estimates of hourly wages and for which no data were missing on the independent variables
specified in the wage functions.  Hourly wage rates were calculated from the OHS data by
converting all reported earnings data to a weekly basis and dividing by hours worked in the past
seven days.  Nevertheless, the OHS is not ideally suited for this purpose because the information
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on hours worked relate to the total hours worked by an individual in the last seven days in all
economic activities whereas the information on earnings relates to total salary/pay (including
overtime and bonus but before deductions) in main employment.  To ensure the reliability of our
hourly wage rate estimates we therefore excluded those employees who either had not worked at
least 35 hours in the past seven days,1 or could be identified as being engaged in economic
activities other than their main job (either as employees2 or on own account), or had reported
earnings on a daily basis.  Information on wages is reported either as an exact amount and/or
within pre-specified intervals on a daily, weekly, monthly or annual3 basis and therefore the data
on the dependent variable consist of both point and interval observations.  The OHS also
provides data on worker and job attributes, including age, education attainment, occupation,
industry, job tenure, trade union membership, location of workplace, and rural-urban locality of
workers.  This information was used to specify the determinants of the wage function.
The final sample contained 10220 observations representing nearly 2.5 million workers in 1995
and 10419 observations representing nearly 3 million workers in 1997.  Tables 1 and 2 present
descriptive statistics for these raised samples.  They show that the racial composition of the
workforce covered by our samples was relatively stable over the two years, with 62% of workers
black, 13% colored, 5% asian and 20% white in 1997.  The average age of the workforce was 37
years in both samples with comparatively little variation between racial groups.  This racial
uniformity is the result both of demographic factors and of labor participation rates with high
levels of youth unemployment, particularly amongst blacks (Standing et al., 1996).  The
educational background of the racial groups differs markedly with over 99% of white workers
and 95% of asians having completed at least a secondary education in comparison to the 15% of
colored workers and 26% of blacks with no more than a primary education in 1997.  Such racial
                                                
1  The 1997 OHS further allowed us to identify workers who worked a 'normal' week in the past seven days.
Limiting the sample to these workers did not appreciably affect the results of the decomposition analysis for 1997.
2 The 1995 OHS does not enable workers holding multiple jobs to be identified.
3 In the 1997 OHS, respondents were not given the option of reporting earnings on an annual basis.
11
 TABLE 1. MEAN CHARACTERISTICS OF RAISED SAMPLE BY RACIAL GROUP 1995
Racial group
Variable Attribute All races Black Coloured Asian White
AGE Age (in years) 37.147 37.916 34.434 35.337 37.092
AGESQ AGE2 1486.81 1535.50 1286.79 1358.40 1500.22
EDPRIM No/Primary education 0.148 0.219 0.173 0.023 0.001
EDSECO Secondary education 0.682 0.650 0.756 0.837 0.685
EDDIPL Diploma 0.109 0.096 0.057 0.072 0.173
EDDEGR Degree 0.060 0.034 0.014 0.068 0.141
OCCMAN Managers 0.059 0.019 0.020 0.076 0.169
OCCPRO Professionals 0.043 0.025 0.016 0.045 0.097
OCCTEC Technicians & associate professionals 0.119 0.093 0.076 0.108 0.201
OCCCLE Clerks 0.097 0.099 0.097 0.183 0.075
OCCSER Service and sales 0.153 0.162 0.125 0.182 0.138
OCCCAT Crafts and trade 0.180 0.141 0.271 0.212 0.221
OCCSSK Semi-skilled 0.191 0.247 0.171 0.155 0.082
OCCUSK Unskilled 0.157 0.215 0.224 0.039 0.018
INDEGW Electricity, Gas & Water 0.019 0.018 0.010 0.005 0.026
INDCON Construction 0.081 0.078 0.159 0.054 0.058
INDWRT Wholesale & Retail Trade 0.193 0.181 0.212 0.333 0.180
INDTSC Transport, Storage & Communication 0.100 0.096 0.086 0.074 0.123
INDFIN Financial 0.078 0.061 0.050 0.073 0.131
INDCSV Community services 0.268 0.305 0.220 0.134 0.237
INDMNF Manufacturing 0.261 0.261 0.263 0.328 0.245
TENURE Time in current job (in years) 8.180 8.434 6.311 8.104 8.519
TENSQ TENURE 2 125.215 126.731 86.050 132.602 139.109
TUMEM Trade union membership (Member=1) 0.403 0.470 0.388 0.312 0.274
WREGWC Western Cape 0.135 0.043 0.638 0.027 0.130
WREGEC Eastern Cape 0.088 0.100 0.098 0.015 0.069
WREGNC Northern Cape 0.013 0.005 0.056 0.000 0.015
WREGFS Free State 0.056 0.068 0.018 0.000 0.058
WREGNW North-West 0.052 0.067 0.011 0.009 0.048
WREGGA Gauteng 0.385 0.406 0.110 0.156 0.525
WREGET Eastern Transvaal 0.048 0.068 0.005 0.006 0.031
WREGNP Northern Province 0.034 0.046 0.026 0.002 0.018
WREGKN Kwazulu/Natal 0.189 0.197 0.038 0.785 0.107
RURAL Rural-urban: (Rural = 1) 0.181 0.273 0.056 0.037 0.061
Mean logarithm of hourly wage 2.324 2.031 2.036 2.546 3.094
Sample size 6867 3616 1217 547 1487
Raised sample size 2475088 1424678 298711 138869 612830
Percentage raised sample 57.56 12.07 5.61 24.76
Source: authors’ calculations based on 1995 OHS data.
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TABLE 2.  MEAN CHARACTERISTICS OF RAISED SAMPLE BY RACIAL GROUP 1997
Racial group
Variable Attribute All races Black Coloured Asian White
AGE Age (in years) 37.199 37.550 35.055 36.352 37.702
AGESQ AGE2 1487.25 1504.96 1337.21 1443.62 1539.70
EDPRIM No/Primary education 0.181 0.257 0.149 0.020 0.004
EDSECO Secondary education 0.663 0.649 0.773 0.826 0.597
EDDIPL Diploma 0.108 0.073 0.058 0.082 0.255
EDDEGR Degree 0.049 0.021 0.021 0.072 0.145
OCCMAN Managers 0.086 0.041 0.065 0.161 0.222
OCCPRO Professionals 0.079 0.056 0.043 0.097 0.170
OCCTEC Technicians & associate professionals 0.076 0.051 0.078 0.105 0.145
OCCCLE Clerks 0.064 0.058 0.069 0.143 0.061
OCCSER Service and sales 0.127 0.144 0.104 0.111 0.095
OCCCAT Crafts and trade 0.197 0.196 0.248 0.141 0.178
OCCSSK Semi-skilled 0.163 0.204 0.130 0.124 0.068
OCCUSK Unskilled 0.207 0.249 0.262 0.117 0.062
INDEGW Electricity, Gas & Water 0.026 0.025 0.021 0.009 0.037
INDCON Construction 0.089 0.095 0.136 0.039 0.054
INDWRT Wholesale & Retail Trade 0.177 0.172 0.163 0.243 0.186
INDTSC Transport, Storage & Communication 0.100 0.099 0.092 0.074 0.115
INDFIN Financial 0.096 0.080 0.087 0.093 0.151
INDCSV Community services 0.243 0.265 0.229 0.152 0.209
INDMNF Manufacturing 0.268 0.264 0.273 0.389 0.249
TENURE Time in current job (in years) 7.978 7.862 6.986 8.446 8.864
TENSQ TENURE 2 124.569 118.428 104.801 141.501 152.238
TUMEM Trade union membership (Member=1) 0.424 0.472 0.448 0.402 0.267
WREGWC Western Cape 0.160 0.052 0.683 0.034 0.187
WREGEC Eastern Cape 0.076 0.084 0.094 0.020 0.057
WREGNC Northern Cape 0.020 0.011 0.072 0.002 0.020
WREGFS Free State 0.058 0.070 0.019 0.001 0.061
WREGNW North-West 0.052 0.073 0.004 0.022 0.027
WREGGA Gauteng 0.348 0.382 0.090 0.175 0.451
WREGET Eastern Transvaal 0.060 0.073 0.004 0.011 0.066
WREGNP Northern Province 0.056 0.085 0.001 0.000 0.016
WREGKN Kwazulu/Natal 0.169 0.170 0.033 0.735 0.116
RURAL Rural-urban: (Rural = 1) 0.196 0.295 0.048 0.020 0.024
Mean logarithm of hourly wage 2.249 1.937 2.220 2.611 3.145
Sample size 7831 4895 1431 385 1120
Raised sample size 2927629 1818518 379801 140157 589153
Percentage raised sample 62.12 12.97 4.79 20.12
Source: authors’ calculations based on 1997 OHS data.
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disparities are, in part, the outcome of past apartheid educational policies such as the Bantu
Education Act 1955, which limited the provision of schooling to native blacks.  Non-white
educational standards were improved following the de Lange Commission 1979 and, more
recently, the passage of the National Education Policy Act 1996, but any resultant convergence
in the educational attainment of workers will inevitably be slow given both the low rate of
turnover of the labor force and the perpetuation of disadvantage caused by household financial
constraints to participation in education (Case and Deaton, 1998).  The relatively low levels of
education received by black and colored workers was reflected in a marked over-representation
of black and colored workers in unskilled and semi-skilled occupational groups as compared to
asians and whites who were more likely to work in white-collar occupations.  Nevertheless,
members of all racial groups participated in all occupations and sectors within the highly
diversified economy.  Length of service in the current job was roughly 8 years on average with
little variation among racial groups.  More than 40% of the workforce was a trade union member
in 1995, with participation rates increasing particularly among colored and asian workers.
Finally, the raised sample statistics reveal regional concentrations of asian employment in
Kwazulu/Natal and Gauteng and of coloreds in Western and Northern Cape, surrounding Cape
Town and Kimberley respectively, with far more uniform distributions of white and black
employment.  These distributions strongly reflect historic settlement patterns and the influence of
legislation, such as the Group Areas Act 1950, which is also partly responsible for black and
colored workers having been more likely to reside in areas designated as rural than are whites
and asians.
Tables 3 and 4 report the results of the wage function analysis based on estimating
separate wage functions for each of the racial groups and for all groups together (Equations 3
and 4) using the 1995 and 1997 OHS data.  Given that the observations on the dependent
variable consist of a mixture of point and interval data, a generalised Tobit estimator (StataCorp,
14
TABLE 3: HOURLY WAGE FUNCTIONS BY RACIAL GROUP 1995
Racial group
All Black Coloured Asian White
Variable Coeff. Std.
Error
Coeff. Std.
Error
Coeff. Std.
Error
Coeff. Std.
Error
Coeff. Std.
Error
AGE 0.0306# 0.0061 0.0288# 0.0089 0.0545# 0.0110 0.0554# 0.0171 0.0954# 0.0102 
AGESQ -0.0003# 0.0001 -0.0003# 0.0001 -0.0006# 0.0001 -0.0005* 0.0002 -0.0011# 0.0001 
EDSECO 0.4048# 0.0274 0.2424# 0.0296 0.3053# 0.0508 0.3005# 0.1061 0.9423 0.6673 
EDDIPL 0.6529# 0.0430 0.4963# 0.0566 0.5151# 0.0836 0.8525# 0.1247 1.0924 0.6681 
EDDEGR 0.9395# 0.0620 0.8763# 0.1011 0.8646# 0.2004 0.9521# 0.1722 1.3272* 0.6687 
OCCMAN 1.2800# 0.0469 0.9622# 0.0966 0.8283# 0.1305 0.6093# 0.1443 0.7821# 0.1128 
OCCPRO 0.9747# 0.0645 0.6789# 0.1048 0.9539# 0.1536 0.4177* 0.2023 0.6131# 0.1243 
OCCTEC 0.9816# 0.0371 0.7390# 0.0510 0.9206# 0.0811 0.5772# 0.1390 0.6661# 0.1087 
OCCCLE 0.5238# 0.0365 0.4897# 0.0460 0.4735# 0.0671 0.3160* 0.1364 0.3028# 0.1153 
OCCSER 0.4760# 0.0341 0.3666# 0.0391 0.3730# 0.0647 0.1815 0.1520 0.3235# 0.1115 
OCCCAT 0.5319# 0.0319 0.2832# 0.0384 0.4069# 0.0543 0.1209 0.1379 0.4002# 0.1065 
OCCSSK 0.3132# 0.0293 0.3148# 0.0339 0.3180# 0.0585 0.1166 0.1380 0.2176 0.1146 
INDEGW 0.1573# 0.0601 0.1689* 0.0778 0.0997 0.1583 0.6511# 0.1916 0.0209 0.0783 
INDCON -0.1914# 0.0425 -0.0935 0.0602 -0.1017 0.0661 -0.0665 0.1391 -0.1162 0.0738 
INDWRT -0.2142# 0.0296 -0.2204# 0.0405 -0.1082 0.0575 -0.0760 0.0849 -0.1723# 0.0512 
INDTSC -0.0097 0.0291 -0.0128 0.0403 0.0477 0.0738 0.1207 0.0761 -0.1095* 0.0497 
INDFIN -0.0145 0.0376 -0.0527 0.0482 -0.0473 0.0849 0.0181 0.1286 0.0486 0.0564 
INDCSV -0.0516 0.0297 0.0252 0.0380 0.0138 0.0576 -0.0133 0.0893 -0.0943 0.0526 
TENURE 0.0334# 0.0033 0.0311# 0.0043 0.0370# 0.0073 0.0411# 0.0085 0.0335# 0.0058 
TENSQ -0.0007# 0.0001 -0.0006# 0.0001 -0.0008# 0.0003 -0.0012# 0.0003 -0.0007# 0.0002 
TUMEM 0.0482* 0.0194 0.1469# 0.0246 0.1770# 0.0380 0.0308 0.0602 0.0638* 0.0304 
WREGWC -0.0429 0.0393 -0.0789 0.0894 -0.2925# 0.0686 -0.1223 0.1213 -0.0645 0.0618 
WREGEC -0.1014# 0.0384 -0.0803 0.0476 -0.3688# 0.0919 -0.1877 0.1133 -0.0969 0.0715 
WREGNC -0.2144# 0.0778 -0.3333 0.1780 -0.5744# 0.0998 -0.4448# 0.0871 -0.1145 0.0970 
WREGFS -0.3422# 0.0569 -0.4486# 0.0505 -0.5801# 0.1906 - 0.0000 -0.0094 0.0674 
WREGNW -0.1308* 0.0573 -0.1276* 0.0640 -0.3673* 0.1723 0.4112# 0.1054 -0.0614 0.0746 
WREGGA 0.1944# 0.0322 0.1620# 0.0376 0.1993* 0.0844 0.2048* 0.0972 0.1962# 0.0502 
WREGET -0.1258* 0.0513 -0.1537# 0.0524 0.2074 0.1434 0.4889* 0.2268 0.0779 0.0704 
WREGNP 0.1400* 0.0559 0.1722# 0.0608 0.2348 0.2224 1.4562# 0.1286 0.0915 0.0926 
RURAL -0.2524# 0.0317 -0.1550# 0.0341 -0.1761 0.1571 -0.4801# 0.1255 -0.0653 0.0800 
Constant 0.6008# 0.1200 0.6972# 0.1779 0.3805 0.2166 0.4862 0.3399 -0.6024 0.6978 
Model χ2 1727066# 781781# 215645# 90899# 411248#
# Denotes significance at the 1% level.  * Denotes significance at the 5% level.
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TABLE 4.  HOURLY WAGE FUNCTIONS BY RACIAL GROUP 1997
Racial group
All Black Coloured Asian White
Variable Coeff. Std.
Error
Coeff. Std.
Error
Coeff. Std.
Error
Coeff. Std.
Error
Coeff. Std.
Error
AGE 0.0404# 0.0062 0.0520# 0.0081 0.0585# 0.0106 0.0688# 0.0177 0.0692# 0.0155 
AGESQ -0.0004# 0.0001 -0.0006# 0.0001 -0.0007# 0.0001 -0.0008# 0.0002 -0.0008# 0.0002 
EDSECO 0.3841# 0.0249 0.2510# 0.0248 0.2291# 0.0642 0.2497 0.1497 0.8416 0.4574 
EDDIPL 0.8404# 0.0400 0.7021# 0.0494 0.7935# 0.0909 0.5991# 0.1686 0.9375* 0.4588 
EDDEGR 1.1053# 0.0646 1.0964# 0.0699 1.0712# 0.1179 0.5183# 0.2009 1.1310* 0.4649 
OCCMAN 0.9182# 0.0437 0.6369# 0.0564 0.5264# 0.0845 0.3970# 0.1302 0.5357# 0.0999 
OCCPRO 0.8018# 0.0489 0.6552# 0.0588 0.5915# 0.1040 0.5186# 0.1548 0.4685# 0.1139 
OCCTEC 0.7004# 0.0441 0.6138# 0.0566 0.5180# 0.0721 0.3207# 0.1203 0.3143# 0.1155 
OCCCLE 0.4222# 0.0366 0.3739# 0.0438 0.4108# 0.0672 0.2184 0.1192 0.0349 0.1087 
OCCSER 0.2652# 0.0362 0.2333# 0.0404 0.3279# 0.0682 0.3492# 0.1325 0.0830 0.1177 
OCCCAT 0.3431# 0.0309 0.2965# 0.0328 0.2614# 0.0526 -0.0345 0.1176 0.1309 0.1065 
OCCSSK 0.1902# 0.0299 0.2510# 0.0323 0.2184# 0.0654 -0.2194 0.1349 -0.0831 0.1234 
INDEGW 0.1318* 0.0585 0.2087# 0.0684 0.0961 0.0820 -0.0425 0.3218 -0.0206 0.1205 
INDCON -0.1045# 0.0369 -0.0329 0.0406 -0.0696 0.0620 0.1590 0.1170 -0.1599 0.1214 
INDWRT -0.1657# 0.0297 -0.1709# 0.0339 -0.1512# 0.0575 -0.0994 0.0800 -0.1468* 0.0701 
INDTSC 0.0030 0.0361 -0.0904* 0.0363 0.0014 0.0803 0.0108 0.1270 0.0652 0.0793 
INDFIN 0.0199 0.0415 -0.0957 0.0493 0.0315 0.0882 0.1367 0.0984 0.1346 0.0744 
INDCSV -0.0230 0.0290 0.0228 0.0332 0.0870 0.0503 0.0336 0.0831 -0.0693 0.0772 
TENURE 0.0307# 0.0036 0.0339# 0.0039 0.0222# 0.0070 0.0216* 0.0104 0.0148 0.0087 
TENSQ -0.0005# 0.0001 -0.0007# 0.0001 -0.0005 0.0003 -0.0005 0.0004 0.0000 0.0003 
TUMEM 0.0456* 0.0206 0.1875# 0.0230 0.1385# 0.0358 0.0300 0.0677 -0.1034* 0.0507 
WREGWC 0.0401 0.0405 -0.0143 0.0531 -0.3699* 0.1473 -0.0226 0.1083 -0.0319 0.0968 
WREGEC -0.1229* 0.0545 -0.0822 0.0552 -0.5445# 0.1616 0.2193 0.1498 -0.1456 0.1415 
WREGNC -0.3197# 0.0685 -0.3362# 0.0871 -0.7220# 0.1573 0.5361# 0.1667 -0.5731* 0.2365 
WREGFS -0.4191# 0.0549 -0.4203# 0.0466 -0.8260# 0.2305 -0.1368 0.1692 -0.2628* 0.1085 
WREGNW -0.2638# 0.0500 -0.1939# 0.0450 -0.3557 0.2746 0.2612 0.2366 -0.4823* 0.1889 
WREGGA 0.0708 0.0372 0.0961# 0.0329 -0.1724 0.1598 0.2383# 0.0855 0.0691 0.0902 
WREGET -0.2242# 0.0555 -0.2659# 0.0427 -0.5081* 0.2157 -0.3181 0.1680 -0.0753 0.1102 
WREGNP -0.2872# 0.0504 -0.2418# 0.0472 -0.1531 0.1757 0.0000 0.0000 -0.1400 0.2427 
RURAL -0.3469# 0.0290 -0.1955# 0.0296 -0.3432# 0.1170 -0.4392# 0.0938 -0.3499* 0.1586 
Constant 0.6074# 0.1207 0.3007 0.1591 0.8077# 0.2387 0.6261 0.3437 0.4942 0.5291 
Model χ2 1668887 # 846676 # 180925 # 59480 # 198191 #
# Denotes significance at the 1% level.  * Denotes significance at the 5% level.
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1997) is used for estimation.  Observations are weighted to reflect estimates of population size
using the 1991 Census in the case of the 1995 OHS and the 1996 Census, as adjusted by a post-
enumeration survey, in the case of the 1997 OHS.  The associated standard errors are
heteroskedastic-consistent and allow for the clustering of the sample with the EA identified as
the PSU.  However we do not allow for the stratification of the sample as the OHS data made
available by Statistics South Africa do not explicitly identify the stratum.  This failure to take the
complex sample design fully into account may be expected to give rise to needlessly large
estimates of the standard errors.
The base case in each function is defined as a non-union worker with no more than a
primary education, employed in an unskilled occupation in the manufacturing sector, and
resident in an urban area of Kwazulu/Natal.  In all cases the overall fit of the regressions as
measured by the χ2 statistic was highly significantly different from zero.  The decomposition
analysis requires that an identical set of variables should be included in all the wage functions
and insignificant variables were therefore retained in some regressions.  Nevertheless, the results
show that most of the coefficients were significant at the 95 per cent level or higher with signs
generally conforming to expectations.
Because the dependent variable is expressed in log form, the coefficients can be
interpreted as the proportional increase in the wage rate expected for a unit increase in the
explanatory variable, with the exception of the two variables involving squared terms.  The
coefficients on the age variables are consistent with human capital theory in that the estimated
age-earnings profiles are all concave with the highest wage rates being paid to workers in their
early forties, ceteris paribus.  The returns to education are consistently positive for all races such
that the majority of workers, who have a secondary level of education, earn more than those
workers with no more than a primary standard of education and less than those who have
obtained either a diploma or degree.  Higher wage rates are linked to higher skills and
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responsibilities, with unskilled workers receiving lower wage rates than workers in other
occupational categories, and those employed in the managerial, professional or associate
professional occupational groups typically earning the most. There is no strong pattern of
sectoral wage variation, although the wholesale and retail trades are consistently identified as a
low wage sector in comparison to manufacturing.  The coefficients on the tenure variables imply
that wage rates are typically a concave or linear function of seniority.  Trade Union membership
is unambiguously associated with higher wages only for blacks and coloureds.  Some regional
variations in wage rates is evident with the wages typically higher in Gauteng (which includes
Johannesburg, Pretoria and Vanderbijlpark) and lower in the Cape and Free State than in
Kwazulu/Natal.  Finally, the rural-urban dummy is negative for all the regressions indicating
that rural workers earn less than urban workers, ceteris paribus.
4.  Multilateral Decomposition of the Racial Wage Hierarchy
Table 5 provides prima facie evidence of South Africa’s well-known hierarchical wage
structure.  It shows that whites had the highest geometric mean wage, followed by asians,
coloreds and finally blacks who received the lowest geometric mean wage of any racial group in
the raised samples extracted from the 1995 and 1997 OHSs.  The geometric mean wage of blacks
fell and that of other racial groups rose between 1995 and 1997: overall the geometric mean
wage of the entire workforce fell over the period.  This section provides an analysis of this
evolving pattern of racial wage disparities.
Table 6 presents the results of the multilateral decomposition analysis based on the
estimated wage functions.  The first part of the table presents estimates of the mean logarithmic
gross wage differential ln(γi+1) between each of the four racial groups and the overall geometric
mean wage, and the constituent elements from the decomposition of these differentials – the
explained racial productivity term ln(θi+1) and unexplained discrimination term ln(δi+1) – under
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TABLE 5. GEOMETRIC MEAN HOURLY WAGES BY RACIAL GROUP, 1995 AND 1997
Racial group
All races Black Colored Asian White
Rand/hr
1995 10.22 7.62 7.66 12.76 22.07
1997 9.48 6.94 9.21 13.61 23.22
Source: Authors’ estimates from wage function regressions.
TABLE 6.  MULTILATERAL DECOMPOSITION OF HOURLY WAGE DIFFERENTIALS BY RACIAL
GROUP
Racial Group
Black Colored Asian White
Coeff. Std.
Error
Coeff. Std.
Error
Coeff. Std.
Error
Coeff. Std.
Error
1995 )1~ln( i +γ -0.293# 0.010 -0.287# 0.022 0.223# 0.035 0.770# 0.016 
)1~ln( i +θ -0.139# 0.005 -0.245# 0.018 0.108# 0.018 0.419# 0.009 
)1~ln( i +δ -0.153# 0.009 -0.042* 0.021 0.115# 0.031 0.351# 0.017 
1997 )1~ln( i +γ -0.312# 0.010 -0.028 0.021 0.362# 0.038 0.896# 0.021 
)1~ln( i +θ -0.182# 0.005 -0.020 0.016 0.272# 0.021 0.509# 0.011 
)1~ln( i +δ -0.130# 0.008 -0.008 0.019 0.090* 0.036 0.387# 0.021 
Changes 1995-97
Gross change in )1~ln( i +γ -0.019
 0.014 0.259# 0.030 0.139# 0.052 0.126# 0.027 
Gross change in )1~ln( i +θ -0.042# 0.007 0.225# 0.024 0.164# 0.027 0.090# 0.014 
  - due to changes in:-  characteristics -0.013 0.008 0.105# 0.026 0.133# 0.025 0.083# 0.015 
residual -0.030# 0.007 0.120# 0.024 0.031 0.027 0.007 0.016 
Gross change in )1~ln( i +δ 0.023 0.012 0.034 0.029 -0.025 0.048 0.036 0.027 
  - due to changes in:-  coefficients 0.028* 0.013 0.083# 0.030 -0.005 0.052 0.051 0.030 
residual -0.004 0.012 -0.049 0.028 -0.020 0.055 -0.015 0.032 
1995 Percentages
Gross wage differential: i~γ -25.4 -25.0 24.9 116.0
- due to:-productivity differential: i
~θ -13.0 -21.7 11.4 52.0
       discrimination: )1~(~ ii +θδ -12.4 -3.2 13.6 64.0
Discrimination coefficient: i
~δ -14.2 -4.1 12.2 42.1
1997
Gross wage differential: i~γ -26.8 -2.8 43.6 145.1
- due to:-productivity differential: i
~θ -16.6 -2.0 31.3 66.4
       discrimination: )1~(~ ii +θδ -10.2 -0.8 12.3 78.7
Discrimination coefficient: i
~δ -12.2 -0.8 9.4 47.3
Notes:  # Denotes significance at the 1% level.  * Denotes significance at the 5% level.
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the hypothetical non-discriminatory wage structure outlined in Section 2.  Both the productivity
and discrimination terms can be either positive or negative.  A positive (negative) productivity
term implies that a given racial group receives a wage premium (discount) due to the group
having higher (lower) productivity levels on average than the typical worker in the workforce as
a whole.  A positive (negative) discrimination term is indicative that the typical worker in a
particular racial group is overpaid (underpaid) relative to what he would receive in the absence
of discrimination.  Note that the productivity and discrimination terms sum to the mean
logarithmic gross wage differential by construction.
From Table 6, the hierarchical wage structure is evident from the estimates of ln(γi+1) for
both years.  These imply that typical white and asian workers earned significantly more than the
overall geometric mean wage, while typical black and colored workers were paid less than this
amount.  Between 1995 and 1997, the gross wage premiums of whites and asians both increased
significantly while the gross wage deficit of coloreds fell to such an extent that the colored
geometric mean wage was no longer significantly below that of the whole workforce by the end
of the period.  These changes have further exacerbated the position of blacks relative to all other
groups with the racial wage hierarchy becoming more pronounced as a result.
The decomposition of the gross logarithmic wage gaps indicates that whites and asians
would have commanded a premium in 1995 in the absence of labor market discrimination due to
above average productivity levels while the wages of coloreds and blacks in 1995 would have
been subject to a discount because of below average productivity levels.  Changes in the
productivity terms between 1995 and 1997 were largely responsible for the changes in the gross
logarithmic wage differentials.  The black disadvantage increased significantly though this was
largely due to the unfavorable effect on relative black wages of changes in predicted non-
discriminatory returns between 1995 and 1997, and can not be attributed to a relative
deterioration in black characteristics priced at 1995 non-discriminatory returns.  In contrast, the
20
colored productivity disadvantage was virtually eliminated by 1997, at least in part as a result of
a significant improvement in the quality of colored workers relative to the entire workforce.  And
the asian and white productivity advantages were both significantly reinforced by relative
improvements in the characteristics of asian and white workers.  Taken as a whole, these results
provide evidence that the productivity basis for racial disparities in hourly wages has been
reinforced over the period.
Productivity differentials were augmented by wage discrimination in the case of black,
asian and white workers, with the results pointing to black underpayments due to employer
discrimination and white and asian overpayments associated with employer nepotism and/or
employee discrimination.  None of the changes in the discrimination terms between 1995 and
1997 were significant.  But changes in relative returns to characteristics between 1995 and 1997
would have led to significant reductions in the size of the black and colored discrimination terms
if they had not been offset by the effects of changes in workforce characteristics over the period.
There is thus limited evidence of some reduction in the relative magnitude of unexplained racial
differences in wages which might be due to a reduction either in market discrimination per se or
in racial differences in the unobservable characteristics of workers.
The final part of Table 6 restates the decomposition results in a more readily intelligible
form by expressing the gross wage, productivity and discrimination differentials as a percentage
of the overall geometric mean wage in each year.  Thus in 1995, the average black, colored,
asian and white worker respectively earned 25% less, 25% less, 25% more and 116% more than
the typical worker who earned the geometric mean wage rate of 10.22 Rands per hour.
However, these figures should not be taken simply to imply that workers of different races
working side by side in identical jobs in the same establishment were paid differently.  Rather
the differentials likely reflect differences between jobs that fall within the same broad
occupational categories of the survey, differences between establishments and so forth.  As such,
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they reflect a combination of the effects of disadvantage and of discrimination in compensation
and in hiring.
The decomposition of the gross wage differential into the productivity differential and a
residual discrimination term exploits the condition that the overall geometric mean wage is
identical under the discriminatory and non-discriminatory wage structures.  The results for 1995
indicate that in the case of black workers the wage differential is attributable equally to
productivity shortfalls and to racial underpayments whereas for coloreds the wage differential
can be attributed largely to productivity discounts.  In contrast, some 55% of the gross wage
differential of both asian and white workers may be attributable to discriminatory overpayments.
However, productivity discounts for black workers and productivity premiums for asian workers
are markedly more important in the 1997 findings where they account for 62% and 72% of the
gross wage differential respectively.
The discrimination coefficients are also reported in the final part of Table 6, and measure
the amount by which a racial group was underpaid/overpaid relative to the wage it would
hypothetically have received in a perfectly competitive labor market.  Between 1995 and 1997
these discrimination coefficients were relatively stable showing little real change.  Thus in 1997
the wages of a typical black, colored, asian and white worker were respectively 12% lower, 1%
lower, 9% higher and 47% higher than they would have been in the absence of discrimination.
Noting that the overall geometric mean wage rate would have been identical in the absence of
discrimination, these estimates suggest the scale of the wage adjustments faced by the various
racial groups if wage discrimination was to be eradicated in the labor market.  However, it is
important to realize that the eradication of wage discrimination would not by itself bring about
total wage convergence since this also requires the elimination of racial productivity
differentials.
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5.  Historical Analysis
Previous studies of the South African labor market, have provided limited evidence, based on
binary comparisons between assorted pairs of racial groups in various years, of a gradual erosion
of the racial wage hierarchy in the decades prior to the end of the apartheid era (Knight and
McGrath, 1987; Moll, 1992; Moll, 1995; Treiman et al., 1996).  In particular, Moll (1995) finds
that the geometric mean wage of black workers rose from 18% to 24% of the corresponding
white wage between 1980 and 1993, based on data from the 1980 Census of South Africa (CSA)
and the 1993 Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development survey.  Using a
multinomial logit technique, he further shows that the proportion of the gross earnings
differential accounted for by wage discrimination fell from 75% in 1980 to 44% in 1993.
Treiman et al. (1996) more broadly examines white/non-white annual income differentials for all
income earners using data drawn from the 1980 CSA and the 1991 CSA.  Their ‘overall picture
shows more stability than change’ (p. 111): the typical black, colored and asian income earner
respectively received 13%, 20% and 37% of their white counterpart in 1980, and received 16%,
20% and 40% as much in 1991.  The percentage of the gross differential attributed to
discrimination (based on the white income structure) fell from 66% to 59% for blacks, from 44%
to 38% for coloreds and from 65% to 64% for asians.  In this section we seek to confirm the
existence of a long-term decrease in racial wage disparities and examine the post-apartheid
evolution of the racial wage hierarchy in the light of this secular decline.
For this purpose we extend our study using data derived from the 5% public use sample
of the 1980 CSA.4 While this source of data does not allow us to replicate our hourly wage
function analysis based on the 1995 and 1997 OHS, it does provide sufficient information to
estimate a rudimentary wages function based on a restricted sample and using monthly earnings
data.  In comparison to our original analysis, the sample is limited geographically as the 1980
                                                
4 We are grateful to Moll for providing us with this data.
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CSA did not include the former TBVC states and, following Moll (1992), we further exclude
under 20 year olds due to conscription of whites in the apartheid era.  Secondly, the dependent
variable in the wage functions had to be specified as earnings per month since the 1980 CSA did
not include questions on the hours worked by respondents.  This may lead to some bias in the
resultant decomposition analysis as possible racial differences in the supply of labor can not be
taken into account.  Finally, the set of explanatory variables is curtailed by the absence of data on
job tenure and trade union membership.  Moreover, location is based on place of residence rather
than of work.
Using the (unweighted) 1980 CSA data, we obtained generalized Tobit estimates of the
monthly earnings functions together with the associated heteroscedasticity-consistent standard
errors.  We also estimated monthly earnings functions for 1995 and 1997 on the basis of the 1980
specification to provide comparable results for the decomposition analysis.  The overall fit of
these earnings functions were again highly significant, and most of the coefficients were
significant at the 95% level or higher with signs conforming to expectations.5  Table 7 presents
the results of the decomposition analysis based on the monthly earnings functions.  The
decomposition results for 1995 and 1997 are broadly consistent with those from the hourly wage
analysis presented in Table 6, providing some evidence of the robustness of the empirical
findings to changes in model specification.
Two main points emerge from the changes in the gross logarithmic wage differentials between
1980 and 1995.  First, the overall racial wage hierarchy was compressed in the latter years of
apartheid. The gross logarithmic wage deficit of blacks and the gross wage logarithmic premium
of whites both declined significantly, leading to a fall in the white/black logarithmic wage
differential from 1.698 to 1.156 over the period.  Second, there was some polarization of wage
                                                
5 The sample characteristics and monthly earnings functions for the historical analysis are presented in a set of
supplementary tables at the end of the paper.
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TABLE 7. MULTILATERAL DECOMPOSITION OF MONTHLY EARNINGS DIFFERENTIALS BY RACIAL
GROUP
Racial Group
Black Colored Asian White
Coeff. Std.
Error
Coeff. Std.
Error
Coeff. Std.
Error
Coeff. Std.
Error
1980 )1~ln( i +γ -0.663# 0.002 -0.230# 0.005 0.054# 0.006 1.035# 0.002 
)1~ln( i +θ -0.334# 0.001 -0.140# 0.003 0.034# 0.003 0.530# 0.002 
)1~ln( i +δ -0.328# 0.002 -0.089# 0.004 0.019# 0.006 0.506# 0.003 
1995 )1~ln( i +γ -0.351# 0.012 -0.312# 0.023 0.231# 0.032 0.805# 0.017 
)1~ln( i +θ -0.160# 0.006 -0.267# 0.017 0.114# 0.019 0.425# 0.009 
)1~ln( i +δ -0.191# 0.011 -0.045* 0.022 0.117# 0.031 0.380# 0.019 
1997 )1~ln( i +γ -0.326# 0.011 -0.086# 0.020 0.290# 0.037 0.876# 0.022 
)1~ln( i +θ -0.176# 0.005 -0.088# 0.016 0.265# 0.020 0.473# 0.010 
)1~ln( i +δ -0.150# 0.009 0.003 0.020 0.025 0.035 0.403# 0.020 
Changes 1980-1995
Gross change in )1~ln( i +γ 0.312
# 0.008 -0.082# 0.020 0.177# 0.025 -0.230# 0.013 
Gross change in )1~ln( i +θ 0.175# 0.006 -0.126# 0.017 0.079# 0.019 -0.105# 0.010 
  - due to changes in:-  characteristics 0.129# 0.002 -0.074# 0.004 0.041# 0.005 -0.029# 0.002 
residual 0.046# 0.006 -0.052# 0.017 0.038* 0.019 -0.076# 0.010 
Gross change in )1~ln( i +δ 0.137# 0.012 0.044* 0.022 0.098# 0.032 -0.126# 0.019 
  - due to changes in:-  coefficients 0.176# 0.014 0.032 0.026 0.092* 0.036 -0.122# 0.020 
residual -0.039* 0.018 0.012 0.033 0.005 0.047 -0.004 0.028 
Changes 1995-1997           
Gross change in )1~ln( i +γ 0.025
 0.014 0.226# 0.029 0.059 0.042 0.071# 0.023 
Gross change in )1~ln( i +θ -0.016* 0.008 0.178# 0.023 0.151# 0.028 0.048# 0.014 
  - due to changes in:-  characteristics -0.003 0.008 0.091# 0.025 0.124# 0.027 0.073# 0.015 
residual -0.013 0.008 0.087# 0.024 0.027 0.028 -0.025 0.015 
Gross change in )1~ln( i +δ 0.041# 0.014 0.048 0.030 -0.092 0.047 0.023 0.027 
  - due to changes in:-  coefficients 0.049# 0.015 0.087# 0.031 -0.059 0.050 0.047 0.029 
residual -0.009 0.013 -0.039 0.030 -0.032 0.052 -0.023 0.030 
1980 Percentages
Gross earnings differential: i~γ -48.5 -20.5 5.5 181.6
- due to:-productivity differential: i
~θ -28.4 -13.1 3.5 69.8
       discrimination: )1~(~ ii +θδ -20.0 -7.4 2.0 111.8
Discrimination coefficient: i
~δ -28.0 -8.5 2.0 65.8
1995
Gross earnings differential: i~γ -29.6 -26.8 26.0 123.7
- due to:-productivity differential: i
~θ -14.8 -23.4 12.1 53.0
       discrimination: )1~(~ ii +θδ -14.8 -3.4 13.9 70.7
Discrimination coefficient: i
~δ -17.4 -4.4 12.4 46.2
1997
Gross earnings differential: i~γ -27.8 -8.2 33.6 140.2
- due to:-productivity differential: i
~θ -16.1 -8.5 30.3 60.5
       discrimination: )1~(~ ii +θδ -11.7 0.2 3.3 79.7
Discrimination coefficient: i
~δ -14.0 0.3 2.5 49.7
Notes:  # Denotes significance at the 1% level.  * Denotes significance at the 5% level.
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rates between blacks and coloreds on the one hand and asians and whites on the other, in spite of
the overall compression of the racial wage hierarchy.  The colored gross logarithmic wage deficit
and the asian gross logarithmic wage premium both increased significantly between 1980 and
1995, leading to an increase in the asian/colored logarithmic differential from 0.284 to 0.543 but
to decreases in both the colored/black and white/asian logarithmic wage differentials from 0.433
to 0.039 and from 0.981 to 0.574 respectively.
The decomposition analysis shows that the changes in the gross logarithmic wage
differentials between 1980 and 1995 were the result of changes in both the productivity and
discrimination components.  In the case of blacks, a significant fall in the scale of the
productivity discount, due largely to an improvement in black worker characteristics relative to
those of the work-force as a whole, was reinforced by a reduction in the extent of discriminatory
underpayment as a result of an improvement in black rates of return to characteristics relative to
those that would have been paid in a non-discriminatory market.  For coloreds, the increase in
the gross logarithmic wage deficit was the result of an increase in the productivity discount, at
least partially due to a relative deterioration in characteristics of colored workers, which was no
more than partially offset by a reduction in the extent of discriminatory underpayments.  As with
blacks, the improvement in the asian position was the outcome of relative improvements in both
characteristics and rates of return to characteristics leading to increases in both the productivity
premium and discriminatory over-payment.  Finally, the erosion of the white gross logarithmic
wage premium was largely the outcome of a relative deterioration in both characteristics and
rates of return to characteristics leading to decreases in both the productivity premium and
discriminatory over-payment.  These results collectively suggest some erosion in both the
productivity and discriminatory bases of the racial wage hierarchy over the latter years of the
apartheid period.
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The changes in the racial wage hierarchy in the latter years of apartheid thus run counter
to many of those that occurred in the early post-apartheid era.  Between 1995 and 1997, the
overall wage hierarchy widened slightly with the white/black gross logarithmic differential rising
marginally to 1.202 by 1997.  The sharp fall in the colored gross logarithmic wage deficit
partially reversed the earlier polarization of wage with the asian/colored differential falling back
to 0.353 in 1997 as a result.  The characteristics of black workers deteriorated relative to those of
workers in all other racial groups.  And there was no further convergence of white rates of return
to characteristics towards those that would have been paid in a non-discriminatory market.
Nevertheless the scale of the changes between 1995 and 1997 were generally small compared to
the considerable transformation of the racial wage hierarchy in the preceding 15 years.
This is apparent from the final part of Table 7, which reports the gross wage, productivity
and discrimination differentials as a percentage of the overall geometric mean wage of 251
Rand/month in 1980, 2014 Rand/month in 1990, and 1986 Rand/month in 1997.  The
compression of the racial wage hierarchy is evident with the typical black worker earning 49%
less than the geometric mean in 1980 but only 28% less in 1997, and the typical white earning
182% more than the geometric mean in 1980 but only 140% more in 1997.  The fall in the
productivity gap between whites and all non-white groups between 1980 and 1997 is manifest in
the changes in the productivity differentials.  And the erosion of the discriminatory basis of the
racial wage hierarchy is also clear from the reductions in the magnitudes of the discrimination
coefficients over the entire period.
Finally, we consider the binary decomposition of white/non-white gross wage
differentials in order to provide results in a similar form to existing estimates in the literature.
From Table 7, the typical black worker is calculated to have earned 18%, 31% and 30% of his
white counterpart in 1980, 1995 and 1997 respectively, with roughly half of the differential being
due to discrimination in each year.  Similarly, the typical colored worker earned 28%, 32% and
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38% of geometric mean white earnings in the three years, with slightly less than half of the
differential being due to discrimination in each year. And the typical asian earned 37%, 56% and
56% as much as the typical white worker, with roughly half of the differential being due to
discrimination in 1980 and 1995, and somewhat more than half in 1997.  These estimates are
broadly consistent with those of Moll (1995) and Treiman et al. (1996) reported earlier, though
differences in methodology and years preclude direct comparison.
6.  Conclusion
The principle contribution of this paper has been to employ a multilateral decomposition to
examine changes in racial wage differentials in the South African labor market between 1995
and 1997, and to view these changes from a longer historical perspective by drawing comparison
with estimated differences in 1980.  The multilateral decomposition technique permits the joint
decomposition of wage differentials between the four racial groups into an explained
productivity component and unexplained discrimination component, and distinguishes between
over- and underpayments enabling the possible sources of discrimination to be isolated.  Thus,
this paper extends the work of Knight and McGrath (1987), Moll (1995) and Treiman et al.
(1996), which have previously explained discriminatory trends, and advances our understanding
of productivity and discriminatory developments in the South African labor market.
Our results suggest that, while the end of apartheid may have been a climacteric political
event, it had little immediate economic consequence for labor market outcomes.  Our first set of
findings, which relate to the decomposition analysis of hourly wage rate data for the early post-
apartheid period between 1995 and 1997, point to the continued existence of substantial gross
wage differentials between races in the South African labor market.  Not only has the apartheid-
induced racial wage hierarchy been maintained during this period but the position of the majority
black workers has actually deteriorated relative to the overall geometric mean wage while that of
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the minority colored, asian and white workers has improved.  There is evidence that the
productivity basis for racial disparities in hourly wages has been reinforced over these two years
and only limited evidence of some reduction in the relative magnitude of unexplained racial
differences in wages which might be due to a reduction in market discrimination per se.  Thus,
the end of apartheid has brought about no immediate improvement in the relative status of the
majority of South Africans, at least in terms of these labor market outcomes; an experience
unlike that of the USA where, following the Civil Rights Act 1964, there was a decade of
sustained and significant decline in the black/white earnings differential (Donahue and Heckman,
1991).
Nevertheless, when the evolution of the racial wage hierarchy wage is viewed from a
longer historical perspective, there is evidence of some long-term erosion in wage differentials in
the latter years of apartheid.  This emerges from our second set of findings, which relate to the
decomposition of monthly earnings data for 1980, 1995 and 1997, and provide evidence of
significant compression of the wage hierarchy between 1980 and 1995.  In particular there were
substantial falls in both the black gross wage deficit and the white gross wage premium which far
exceeded the scale of any offsetting increases in the early post-apartheid period.  Decomposition
of these changes suggests that they were driven by the compression both of productivity
differentials as a result in part of some convergence in worker characteristics, and of residual
disparities that may be attributable in part to a reduction in discrimination.  The resumption of
these less discriminatory, more socially equitable longer-term trends will depend critically upon
the ability to improve the status of black workers relative to coloreds, asians and, especially,
white workers.
In the post-apartheid era, labor market legislation has been subject to fundamental reform
with most employees now covered by a single set of labor laws, including those working in
agriculture, domestic service and the state (Barker, 1999).  The Labor Relations Act 1995
29
codifies the limitations on discrimination set out in the Bill of Rights and the Constitution
(Presidential Commission, 1996), while the Employment Equity Bill 1998 and the Basic
Conditions of Employment Act 1998 seek to promote equity and efficiency within the labor
market.  In particular, the Employment Equity Act sanctions racial employment targets through
the mechanism of affirmative action plans agreed between employers and employees on statutory
Workplace Fora, and also formalizes powerful rights provided by the Constitution for any
employee or employment applicant to institute proceedings through the Commission for
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) against an employer for alleged discrimination
(Barker, 1999).6  Finally, the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act
2000 provides more general legislation required by Section 9 of the Constitution both to prevent
or prohibit unfair discrimination and to promote achievement of equality.
These various labor market measures provide powerful instruments to counter the
discriminatory practices and attitudes that have sustained white overpayment and black
underpayment.  However, the experience of the USA following the Civil Rights Act of 1964
suggests that some forms of discrimination can be extremely persistent and not easily countered
by legislation.  Such discrimination may take the form of social interactions and networks, which
may influence behavior (Arrow, 1998, p. 98); informal screening devices biased against specific
groups; and other socially-based or covert means.  The continuation of racially segregated
housing in South Africa may, for example, sustain such social networks, while Standing et al.
(1996), and Case and Deaton (1998) provide evidence of informal screening devices adopted in
the South African labor market.  Moreover, our findings suggest that in 1997 the wage of a
typical white worker was 47% higher than it would have been in the absence of discrimination
while that of a typical black was 12% below what it would have been in a non-discriminatory
market.  That white wages would have to fall and black wages rise in order to eradicate
                                                
6 Under the Act, the burden of proof falls on the employer to prove that there were fair reasons for differentiating
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discrimination is not of itself particularly surprising.  But, wage adjustments on the required
scale seem likely to provoke opposition from adversely affected groups and are only likely to be
achievable in the context of a growing economy where opportunities for realignment are more
frequent and more easily taken.
Policy initiatives have also been taken to tackle the causes of labor market disadvantage
faced by specific racial groups.  The National Education Policy Act 1996, Further Education
Training Bill 1998 and Skills Development Bill 1998 have sought to address the qualitative
differences within the education system, in vocational training and skill acquisition opportunities
faced by different groups (Standing et al., 1996; Bhorat et al., 1998).  While there are clear
budgetary constraints to enhancing educational opportunities for the black majority, Moll (1998)
argues that school productivity could be raised by certain near-costless reallocations of
resources, for example, in favor of computational skills which appear to be more important than
comprehension skills in influencing wages.  Our results suggest that positive returns to education
and training exist for all races, providing the incentives for the blacks to take advantage of these
opportunities, while Moll (1996), focussing on primary schooling returns, identifies potential for
growth in blacks’ returns.  Nevertheless, household financial constraints to participation in
education (Case and Deaton, 1998) may frustrate attempts to narrow productivity differentials in
the absence of significant income and wealth redistribution.
In conclusion, much of the necessary labor market and broader social policies appear now
to be in place to offer the opportunity of creating a non-discriminatory labor market.  However,
this study has shown that while there has been a long-term erosion of the racial wage hierarchy, a
narrowing of racial productivity differentials and a reduction in discrimination to the benefit of
the majority of South African workers, developments in the early post-apartheid era have been
less favorable.  Given the persistence of social attitudes and structures and the perpetuation of
                                                                                                                                                            
between individuals.  According to the South African Business Day (28 December 1998) the CCMA had received
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disadvantage, there is a continuing role for the monitoring and analysis of racial wage
differentials to inform policy-makers of the effectiveness of policy interventions and to highlight
any need for further reforms.
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SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES: ANALYSIS OF MONTHLY EARNINGS 1980, 1995,1997.
TABLE S1.  MEAN CHARACTERISTICS OF SAMPLE BY RACIAL GROUP 1980
Racial group
Variable Attribute All races Black Coloured Asian White
AGE Age in years 35.303 34.674 33.643 34.228 36.972
AGESQ AGE2 1367.05 1314.19 1246.67 1276.66 1500.61
EDPRIM No/Primary Education 0.243 0.421 0.237 0.108 0.007
EDSECO Secondary Education 0.649 0.553 0.717 0.804 0.739
EDDIPL Diploma 0.070 0.022 0.038 0.054 0.152
EDDEGR Degree 0.038 0.003 0.008 0.034 0.101
OCCMAN Managers 0.051 0.005 0.012 0.030 0.135
OCCPRO Professionals 0.081 0.038 0.053 0.084 0.154
OCCTEC Technicians and Associate Professionals 0.050 0.012 0.019 0.039 0.117
OCCCLE Clerks 0.089 0.068 0.080 0.210 0.102
OCCSER Service and Sales 0.183 0.224 0.133 0.175 0.144
OCCCAT Crafts and Trade 0.231 0.206 0.348 0.226 0.226
OCCSSK Semi-skilled 0.188 0.242 0.188 0.183 0.108
OCCUSK Unskilled 0.128 0.204 0.167 0.053 0.015
INDMNF Manufacturing 0.328 0.345 0.341 0.421 0.284
INDEGW Electricity, Gas and Water 0.022 0.022 0.016 0.005 0.026
INDCON Construction 0.111 0.117 0.195 0.067 0.081
INDWRT Wholesale and Retail Trade 0.162 0.178 0.146 0.258 0.128
INDTSC Transport, Storage and Communication 0.113 0.091 0.091 0.078 0.159
INDFIN Financial 0.048 0.023 0.023 0.042 0.094
INDCSV Community Services 0.215 0.223 0.187 0.129 0.228
RREGCAP Cape 0.270 0.154 0.832 0.035 0.279
RREGOFS Orange Free State 0.060 0.081 0.019 0.000 0.055
RREGTVL Transvaal 0.475 0.559 0.110 0.137 0.536
RREGNAT Natal 0.195 0.207 0.039 0.828 0.130
RURAL Rural-Urban (Rural = 1) 0.134 0.200 0.080 0.063 0.068
Mean logarithm of monthly earnings 5.526 4.863 5.297 5.580 6.562
Sample size 123687 60620 14666 6675 41726
Percentage sample 49.01 11.86 5.40 33.74
Source: authors’ calculations based on 5% Public Use Sample of 1980 Population Census data.
34
TABLE S2.  MEAN CHARACTERISTICS OF RAISED SAMPLE BY RACIAL GROUP 1995
Racial group
Variable Attribute All races Black Coloured Asian White
AGE Age in years 37.231 37.915 34.716 35.785 37.394
AGESQ AGE2 1490.83 1533.49 1304.12 1385.50 1518.97
EDPRIM No/Primary Education 0.143 0.219 0.174 0.023 0.001
EDSECO Secondary Education 0.688 0.661 0.752 0.832 0.680
EDDIPL Diploma 0.109 0.091 0.059 0.074 0.176
EDDEGR Degree 0.060 0.029 0.014 0.070 0.143
OCCMAN Managers 0.062 0.018 0.020 0.076 0.170
OCCPRO Professionals 0.043 0.022 0.016 0.046 0.098
OCCTEC Technicians and Associate Professionals 0.115 0.082 0.073 0.108 0.203
OCCCLE Clerks 0.095 0.095 0.097 0.182 0.074
OCCSER Service and Sales 0.147 0.153 0.125 0.181 0.136
OCCCAT Crafts and Trade 0.189 0.149 0.276 0.213 0.221
OCCSSK Semi-skilled 0.193 0.259 0.169 0.156 0.080
OCCUSK Unskilled 0.156 0.221 0.224 0.038 0.017
INDMNF Manufacturing 0.272 0.281 0.262 0.327 0.245
INDEGW Electricity, Gas and Water 0.019 0.018 0.010 0.005 0.027
INDCON Construction 0.083 0.081 0.159 0.055 0.057
INDWRT Wholesale and Retail Trade 0.195 0.186 0.212 0.335 0.176
INDTSC Transport, Storage and Communication 0.103 0.101 0.088 0.073 0.123
INDFIN Financial 0.080 0.061 0.052 0.069 0.132
INDCSV Community Services 0.248 0.272 0.217 0.136 0.240
RREGCAP Cape 0.219 0.102 0.799 0.041 0.216
RREGOFS Orange Free State 0.059 0.077 0.018 0.000 0.055
RREGTVL Transvaal 0.515 0.589 0.147 0.173 0.621
RREGNAT Natal 0.206 0.232 0.036 0.786 0.108
RURAL Rural-Urban (Rural = 1) 0.150 0.229 0.054 0.035 0.062
Mean logarithm of monthly earnings 7.608 7.257 7.296 7.839 8.413
Sample size 6121 2937 1192 532 1460
Raised sample size 2242394 1212709 291642 135215 602827
Percentage raised sample 54.08 13.00 6.03 26.88
Source: authors’ calculations based on 1995 OHS data.
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TABLE S3.  MEAN CHARACTERISTICS OF RAISED SAMPLE BY RACIAL GROUP 1997
Racial group
Variable Attribute All races Black Coloured Asian White
AGE Age in years 37.242 37.465 35.431 36.753 37.898
AGESQ AGE2 1488.35 1496.70 1359.31 1470.35 1551.65
EDPRIM No/Primary Education 0.174 0.255 0.150 0.020 0.004
EDSECO Secondary Education 0.667 0.656 0.769 0.827 0.593
EDDIPL Diploma 0.109 0.068 0.060 0.080 0.257
EDDEGR Degree 0.051 0.020 0.021 0.072 0.147
OCCMAN Managers 0.091 0.042 0.067 0.168 0.222
OCCPRO Professionals 0.080 0.054 0.044 0.097 0.171
OCCTEC Technicians and Associate Professionals 0.077 0.049 0.077 0.108 0.145
OCCCLE Clerks 0.062 0.055 0.068 0.141 0.061
OCCSER Service and Sales 0.125 0.142 0.104 0.116 0.094
OCCCAT Crafts and Trade 0.194 0.192 0.252 0.132 0.176
OCCSSK Semi-skilled 0.163 0.208 0.130 0.129 0.069
OCCUSK Unskilled 0.208 0.258 0.259 0.108 0.061
INDMNF Manufacturing 0.271 0.269 0.273 0.384 0.249
INDEGW Electricity, Gas and Water 0.027 0.026 0.021 0.010 0.036
INDCON Construction 0.089 0.097 0.134 0.039 0.053
INDWRT Wholesale and Retail Trade 0.178 0.174 0.160 0.246 0.185
INDTSC Transport, Storage and Communication 0.101 0.100 0.091 0.077 0.116
INDFIN Financial 0.097 0.079 0.088 0.089 0.152
INDCSV Community Services 0.237 0.255 0.232 0.155 0.209
RREGCAP Cape 0.245 0.117 0.849 0.054 0.255
RREGOFS Orange Free State 0.059 0.070 0.020 0.001 0.067
RREGTVL Transvaal 0.512 0.618 0.099 0.190 0.562
RREGNAT Natal 0.183 0.195 0.033 0.755 0.116
RURAL Rural-Urban (Rural = 1) 0.158 0.244 0.047 0.021 0.024
Mean logarithm of monthly earnings 7.594 7.268 7.508 7.884 8.470
Sample size 7048 4184 1389 371 1104
Raised sample size 2667319 1581624 369059 134434 582202
Percentage raised sample 59.30 13.84 5.04 21.83
Source: authors’ calculations based on 1997 OHS data.
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TABLE S4.  MONTHLY EARNINGS FUNCTIONS BY RACIAL GROUP 1980
Racial group
All Black Coloured Asian White
Variable Coeff. Std.
Error
Coeff. Std.
Error
Coeff. Std.
Error
Coeff. Std.
Error
Coeff. Std.
Error
AGE 0.0605# 0.0013 0.0434# 0.0015 0.0715# 0.0031 0.0834# 0.0043 0.1173# 0.0017 
AGESQ -0.0006# 0.0000 -0.0005# 0.0000 -0.0008# 0.0000 -0.0010# 0.0001 -0.0013# 0.0000 
EDSECO 0.6409# 0.0048 0.1705# 0.0047 0.3528# 0.0124 0.2943# 0.0208 0.4130# 0.0538 
EDDIPL 1.2026# 0.0096 0.4966# 0.0223 0.8038# 0.0325 0.6833# 0.0371 0.6341# 0.0543 
EDDEGR 1.5077# 0.0124 0.8908# 0.0628 1.0823# 0.0486 0.9388# 0.0537 0.8028# 0.0550 
OCCMAN 1.3425# 0.0107 0.4406# 0.0383 0.8597# 0.0462 0.7529# 0.0525 0.5916# 0.0271 
OCCPRO 0.7673# 0.0111 0.4123# 0.0189 0.6639# 0.0300 0.5704# 0.0413 0.4338# 0.0271 
OCCTEC 1.0051# 0.0109 0.3130# 0.0250 0.6075# 0.0405 0.5942# 0.0426 0.4405# 0.0269 
OCCCLE 0.5035# 0.0089 0.2449# 0.0099 0.4613# 0.0195 0.3648# 0.0294 0.2485# 0.0270 
OCCSER 0.2624# 0.0077 -0.0002 0.0074 0.1760# 0.0194 0.2160# 0.0323 0.2189# 0.0271 
OCCCAT 0.4337# 0.0069 0.0709# 0.0068 0.3466# 0.0152 0.2293# 0.0303 0.2250# 0.0264 
OCCSSK 0.2458# 0.0070 0.1556# 0.0065 0.2640# 0.0159 0.1588# 0.0303 0.1868# 0.0270 
INDEGW 0.1504# 0.0146 0.0436# 0.0139 -0.0392 0.0340 0.1590* 0.0803 -0.0391* 0.0152 
INDCON 0.0226# 0.0075 -0.0296# 0.0077 -0.0290 0.0151 0.1916# 0.0282 -0.0625# 0.0108 
INDWRT -0.1873# 0.0066 -0.1566# 0.0066 -0.1541# 0.0161 -0.0429* 0.0180 -0.1138# 0.0095 
INDTSC 0.0938# 0.0069 -0.0168* 0.0078 -0.0897# 0.0175 0.0342 0.0228 -0.1570# 0.0075 
INDFIN 0.1515# 0.0103 -0.0057 0.0154 0.1228# 0.0293 0.1254# 0.0376 -0.0168 0.0100 
INDCSV -0.2595# 0.0065 -0.1882# 0.0071 -0.1006# 0.0155 -0.0512* 0.0224 -0.3052# 0.0078 
REGCAP 0.0630# 0.0060 -0.0776# 0.0077 -0.3025# 0.0269 0.0978# 0.0358 -0.0963# 0.0080 
REGOFS -0.0520# 0.0102 -0.0828# 0.0099 -0.4172# 0.0485 - 0.0000 -0.0376# 0.0129 
REGTVL 0.1573# 0.0055 0.0830# 0.0061 0.0627* 0.0310 0.4352# 0.0203 0.0499# 0.0072 
RURAL -0.3035# 0.0070 -0.2037# 0.0069 -0.1576# 0.0203 -0.0988# 0.0262 -0.1017# 0.0126 
CONSTANT 3.2235# 0.0250 3.8567# 0.0275 3.6322# 0.0643 3.2921# 0.0818 3.4503# 0.0686 
Model χ2 76254# 11014# 5535# 2866# 18980#
# Denotes significance at the 1% level.  * Denotes significance at the 5% level.
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TABLE S5.  MONTHLY EARNINGS FUNCTIONS BY RACIAL GROUP 1995
Racial group
All Black Coloured Asian White
Variable Coeff. Std.
Error
Coeff. Std.
Error
Coeff. Std.
Error
Coeff. Std.
Error
Coeff. Std.
Error
AGE 0.0476# 0.0065 0.0435# 0.0098 0.0724# 0.0113 0.0902# 0.0169 0.1239# 0.0097 
AGESQ -0.0004# 0.0001 -0.0004# 0.0001 -0.0008# 0.0001 -0.0009# 0.0002 -0.0014# 0.0001 
EDSECO 0.4512# 0.0301 0.2593# 0.0326 0.3404# 0.0520 0.3800# 0.1087 0.8844 0.7968 
EDDIPL 0.6817# 0.0452 0.5065# 0.0550 0.5639# 0.0913 0.9070# 0.1233 1.0071 0.7976 
EDDEGR 0.9514# 0.0665 0.8610# 0.1228 0.8237# 0.1989 0.9623# 0.1770 1.2179 0.7983 
OCCMAN 1.3625# 0.0496 0.8906# 0.1011 0.8289# 0.1293 0.5779# 0.1527 0.7857# 0.1483 
OCCPRO 1.0718# 0.0691 0.6406# 0.1162 1.0296# 0.1738 0.4693* 0.1905 0.6300# 0.1558 
OCCTEC 1.0152# 0.0396 0.7224# 0.0543 0.9119# 0.0907 0.5152# 0.1444 0.6006# 0.1466 
OCCCLE 0.5338# 0.0383 0.4723# 0.0476 0.5065# 0.0615 0.3109* 0.1422 0.2113 0.1540 
OCCSER 0.5306# 0.0366 0.3902# 0.0416 0.3958# 0.0646 0.1533 0.1507 0.2952* 0.1470 
OCCCAT 0.5772# 0.0345 0.2938# 0.0410 0.4051# 0.0562 0.1345 0.1489 0.3586* 0.1453 
OCCSSK 0.3498# 0.0310 0.3460# 0.0351 0.3591# 0.0598 0.1125 0.1440 0.1737 0.1535 
INDEGW 0.1743# 0.0621 0.1917* 0.0804 0.1526 0.1415 0.3733* 0.1727 0.0326 0.0756 
INDCON -0.2594# 0.0444 -0.1913# 0.0632 -0.2104# 0.0625 -0.1068 0.1461 -0.1041 0.0756 
INDWRT -0.2443# 0.0303 -0.2515# 0.0415 -0.1714# 0.0553 -0.0764 0.0798 -0.2251# 0.0513 
INDTSC 0.0482 0.0313 0.0067 0.0389 0.0877 0.0724 0.1337 0.0794 0.0001 0.0547 
INDFIN -0.0488 0.0397 -0.1407# 0.0499 -0.1437 0.0782 -0.0270 0.1229 0.0332 0.0565 
INDCSV -0.0787# 0.0305 -0.0263 0.0392 -0.0147 0.0577 -0.0029 0.0905 -0.0828 0.0522 
REGCAP -0.0971# 0.0358 -0.1985# 0.0643 -0.3929# 0.0706 -0.1988* 0.0917 -0.1037* 0.0522 
REGOFS -0.3049# 0.0559 -0.3761# 0.0491 -0.5701# 0.1657 - 0.0000 -0.0621 0.0643 
REGTVL 0.1247# 0.0317 0.0811* 0.0355 0.0610 0.0824 0.1917* 0.0813 0.1401# 0.0477 
RURAL -0.2910# 0.0375 -0.2251# 0.0380 -0.1988 0.1514 -0.4839# 0.1376 -0.0350 0.0840 
CONSTANT 5.6150# 0.1346 5.8349# 0.1985 5.5314# 0.2410 5.2044# 0.3606 4.4447# 0.8263 
Model χ2 1488485# 542869# 178324# 74454# 367312#
# Denotes significance at the 1% level.  * Denotes significance at the 5% level.
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TABLE S6.  MONTHLY EARNINGS FUNCTIONS BY RACIAL GROUP 1997
Racial group
All Black Coloured Asian White
Variable Coeff. Std.
Error
Coeff. Std.
Error
Coeff. Std.
Error
Coeff. Std.
Error
Coeff. Std.
Error
AGE 0.0589# 0.0062 0.0730# 0.0076 0.0640# 0.0112 0.0926# 0.0160 0.0887# 0.0147 
AGESQ -0.0006# 0.0001 -0.0008# 0.0001 -0.0007# 0.0001 -0.0011# 0.0002 -0.0009# 0.0002 
EDSECO 0.4288# 0.0266 0.2914# 0.0269 0.2588# 0.0589 0.2598 0.1423 0.8478 0.4705 
EDDIPL 0.8826# 0.0400 0.7484# 0.0491 0.8395# 0.0900 0.6231# 0.1614 0.9424* 0.4700 
EDDEGR 1.1289# 0.0667 1.0222# 0.0731 1.0420# 0.1153 0.6327# 0.1833 1.1386* 0.4769 
OCCMAN 0.9559# 0.0434 0.6890# 0.0556 0.6241# 0.0783 0.4054# 0.1198 0.4899# 0.1001 
OCCPRO 0.7585# 0.0501 0.5760# 0.0557 0.5585# 0.1018 0.4022# 0.1482 0.4255# 0.1126 
OCCTEC 0.6929# 0.0460 0.5630# 0.0570 0.5979# 0.0709 0.3007* 0.1211 0.2420* 0.1143 
OCCCLE 0.4038# 0.0381 0.3686# 0.0448 0.4113# 0.0696 0.1191 0.1175 -0.0097 0.1106 
OCCSER 0.3188# 0.0369 0.2902# 0.0412 0.3831# 0.0650 0.3189# 0.1203 0.0534 0.1194 
OCCCAT 0.3150# 0.0322 0.2593# 0.0342 0.2615# 0.0544 -0.0655 0.1314 0.0405 0.1059 
OCCSSK 0.1992# 0.0307 0.2810# 0.0322 0.2122# 0.0708 -0.2340 0.1336 -0.1575 0.1223 
INDEGW 0.0760 0.0603 0.1167 0.0727 0.0824 0.0766 -0.0218 0.3754 -0.0655 0.1145 
INDCON -0.1519# 0.0390 -0.1526# 0.0422 -0.0963 0.0583 0.1168 0.1193 -0.0636 0.1188 
INDWRT -0.1851# 0.0303 -0.2354# 0.0345 -0.1622# 0.0572 -0.0548 0.0783 -0.1266 0.0728 
INDTSC 0.0732* 0.0363 -0.0518 0.0345 0.0450 0.0895 0.0290 0.1206 0.1239 0.0744 
INDFIN 0.0307 0.0418 -0.1176* 0.0490 -0.0389 0.0865 0.0691 0.1014 0.1699* 0.0763 
INDCSV -0.0650* 0.0287 -0.0525 0.0329 0.0697 0.0460 0.0259 0.0864 -0.0623 0.0768 
REGCAP -0.0903* 0.0383 -0.1959# 0.0403 -0.4374# 0.1548 0.0480 0.1004 -0.1254 0.0954 
REGOFS -0.3320# 0.0560 -0.3495# 0.0474 -0.8665# 0.2364 0.2756 0.1424 -0.2829# 0.1060 
REGTVL -0.0493 0.0336 -0.0576* 0.0290 -0.2675 0.1622 0.2007# 0.0731 -0.0237 0.0857 
RURAL -0.4008# 0.0296 -0.2629# 0.0306 -0.3888# 0.1154 -0.3754# 0.0753 -0.2853* 0.1214 
CONSTANT 5.6531# 0.1255 5.4217# 0.1550 6.0966# 0.2609 5.5419# 0.3117 5.5049# 0.5472 
Model χ2 1397972# 577695# 160453# 54242# 165290#
# Denotes significance at the 1% level.  * Denotes significance at the 5% level.
